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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
OKLAND LTD., INC., and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

OKLAND LTD.,INC.,

;

!

Third-party Plaintiff,

;

vs.

;

DOUG BRADSHAW, ROBERT M.
SIMONSEN, CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP, a
limited partnershiD, and
JOHN DOES 1-5,
*

!
j
;
{
!

Case No. 86-314-CA

Thirdrparty Defendants.

Appeal from a Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge Presiding
(District Court No. C84-29U)
Plaintiff-respondent's First Security Financial Response to
Defendant-appellant's, Okland Ltd, Inc., Petition for Rehearing

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals and this Court's letter dated March 7, 1988 inviting
a response to Appellant Okland Ltd.,

Inc., (hereinafter

Appellant) petition for rehearing, Respondent First Security
Financial (hereinafter Respondent),

hereby responds to

said petition for rehearing as follows:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO STATE ANY FACTS OR
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT IT'S CONTENTION THAT
THERE SHOULD BE A REAHEARING ON THIS MATTER
Appellant has not stated any new facts or authority
for which this court could grant it's petition for rehearing.
Appellant has only restated its unproved version of the
facts as alleged in it's brief and it's supplemental filing
of recent authorities.

There has been no newly discovered

evidence nor any new authority which would change this Court's
Decision rendered February 10, 1988.

This decision is attached

hereto and incorporated herein by this reference and marked
as respondent's Exhibit A.
Respondent further asks the court for a further award
of costs and attorneys fees in this matter as
this petition is filed only for delay.

it feels that

This "can

be allowed

pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

POINT II
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS ON FEBRUARY 10, 1988 IS PROPER.
A. Was the defense of "Whether the agreement is void and unenforceable as a pently or otherwise contained unconscionable
liquidated damages provisions11 properly before the trial court?
Appellant contends that the above defense was properly
presented at the trial court level and thus it was improper for
the Utah Court of Appeals not to consider it on review.

The

decision states that the above defense "was not raised before the
trial court and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984); James v. Preston,
746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987)."
Appellant contends that by it raising this issue in
it's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent/Plaintiff!s Motion
for Summary Judgment it was properly before the trial court. This
Memorandum is not a verified statement.
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that:
"(b) HOW PRESENTED. Every defense, in law or
fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process,
(5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. . . .If
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further
-2-

states that:
,f

(h) WAIVER OF DEFENSES. A party waives all
defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if
he has made no motion, in his answer or reply,. . ."
Appellant never raised this defense in any responsive pleading
to the complaint or in any motion.

Appellant did in fact amend

its answer to respondent/plaintiffs complaint in order to raise
additional defenses but did not place this defense in it's
amended answer. (Amended Answer R.189-96). Appellant had ample
opportunity to present this defense properly in the trial court
which it failed to do.

It is clear that Appellant waived this

defense.
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed this issue many
times and has ruled each time that if a defense is not properly
raised in the lower court, it is waived.
1352, 1353 (Utah, 1986).

Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d

In Valley Bank and Trust Company v.

Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, (Utah, 1983), a similar issue was raised
by a debtor.

In that case a creditor brought an action against

some debtors on two promissory notes and the trial court granted
Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

One of the debtors

then appealed alleging that the trial court: should have allowed
its defense of failure of consideration which was raised for the
first time in debtor's affidavit to plaintiff!s motion for
Summary Judgment.

The Supreme Court held that this defense should

have been raised by the debtor in its answer to plaintiff's complaint
or by motion.

In affirming the trial court the Supreme Court stated:
-3-

"It is not the office of an affidavit in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment
to provide a means of introducing defenses
which have not been raised by the answer or
by proper motion. Rule 12(b), U.R.C.P.
Affidavits are proper to address factual
matters relating to issues already framed.
Since the defense was not properly raised
she (appellant) waived it.11 at 494.
Appellantsmemorandum in opposition to Respondent/plaintifffs
Motion for Summary Judgment is not a proper place to raise
this defense. Memorandums are pleadings, unverified, which
are used to argue points and authorities in support of the
then existing propositions, defenses and claims, not to raise
new defenses and present new unproven facts.
Appellant again tries to raise new issues based
upon unproven facts. Appellant states in his petition that
Respondents "actual damages11 are only $1,800.00. Appellants
support for this allegation is it's own brief filed herein.
There is no other support.

Respondents damages, which are

all proper under the agreement between the parties,is fully
set forth in the Summary Judgment entered by the trial court.
A true and exact copy of which is attached herein as exhibit B
and incorporated herein by this reference. Appellant provided
no proof in the trial court to raise an issue that the damages
claimed by the plaintiff are not proper.
It is good at this point to remind this coutt that
Appellant fully admits his liability under this agreement.
(Appellant's brief, pg. 5)
Therefore this court was proper is not addressing
-4-

the issue of whether the agreement was void as a penalty or contained
an unconscionable liquidated damage provision.

It is also the

opinion of the Respondent that even if this court was to review
the

allegations of the Appellant, the decision would not change.

Appellant has set forth no facts to support its contentions#

B. Did the Appellant assert any defenses under Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code?
Appellant clearly misses the point of the court's
decision in this matter dated February 10, 1988.

This court

stated:
"Futhermore, Okland has not asserted any
specific (emphasis added) defenses or counterclaims
as a debtor under Article 9. Given that failure
it makes no difference if the contract at issue
is either a lease or a sales agreement.ff [See
attached exhibit A, pg 6]
Appellant still has not asserted any specific defenses
or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code or how any of the defenses would apply to
this situation.

It is the Respondents position that none would

apply even if the agreement was ever construed as a security
agreement and not a lease.

Appellant has presented no facts

contary to this position.
Appellant has a burden to present some evidence in the
trial court to establish his allegations and defenses. This
is its burden of proof.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in

Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975) that:
-5-

"The proponent of a proposition has two
burdens relative to his proof: to produce
evidence which proves or tends to prove the
proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier
of fact that his evidence is more credible or
entitled to the greater weight, (footnote omitted)'1
Appellant failed to produce any competent evidence
at the trial court level and was thus unable to persuade the
trier of fact that its evidence was more credible that the
evidence produced by the Respondent.

The trial court can

only look at the evidence properly before it.

C. Is the Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc., v.
Larson Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, (Utah 1986) distinguishable
from the present matter?
Appellant relies very heavily upon the Colonial Leasing
case, infra.

It wishes

this court

to

use Colonial1s rationale

as a means to remand this case back to the trial court for
further proceeds and to allow parol evidence in to show that
the agreement was not a fftrue lease11 but an agreement " intended
as one for security" and thus covered by Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
There are two basic reasons why Colonial Leasing
is not controlling.

The first reason is that the facts in both

cases are very different.

In Colonial Leasing the creditor

entered into an agreement with a debtor called a "lease". The
debtor defaulted on the agreed payments.

The creditor repossesed

the equipment under the agreement and the trial court granted judg
to the creditor for the amount due under the agreement, less the
-6-

proceeds from the sale of the equipment after repossession.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter back
to the trial court for it to allow parol evidence into the
case to determine whether the agreement was in fact a lease
or an agreement intended only as security and governed by
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
by the debtor because the debtor

This was asked for

believed that the creditor

"failed to comply with Article 9 requirements in disposing of the
collateral, Larsen (debtor) contends that Colonial (creditor)
was therefore, precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment.ff
This is not the facts of this case.
'fep'ossesed

or disposed

The equipment has never been

of by the Respondent.

Since the

equipment has never been repossesed, Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code would not play a substanial role upon default.
As stated by this court in its February 10. 1988 decision:
"Therefore, First Security was within its rights,;
even as a secured creditor,
in not repossessing and
selling the "collateral1,1 and then applying those
proceeds to the debt." at pg.5
It appears that repossession is an operative fact distinguishing
Colonial Leasing and the present matter.
The second reason is that even if it was remanded
back to the trial court to allow parol evidence as allegedly
exists by the Appellant,it would not change the outcome of
the matter.

Summary Judgment is appropriate, even

in dispute,as contended by Appellant,

if the facts

yere allowed,

it would

not change the case and the moving party would be entitled to
-7-
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D. Was the matter reviewed in a "light most favorable to the
Appellant,"the party against whom the summary judgment was granted?
It is true that when the appellate court reviews the
trial courts granting of a motion for Summary Judgment, the facts
must be viewed in a light favorable to the losing party, but it
also states that when it appears from the pleadings on file,
the affidavits filed in support and in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment and hearing counsel for both sides and there
still appears to be no genuine issue of material fact, then
summary judgment is

not only proper, but required. Burningham v.

Ott, 525 P.2d 620, (Utah, 1974).
This is the case here. Appellant never did present
any evidence in support of his allegations and clearly failed
to meet its burden of proof and pursuasion.

There is nothing

in the record to contradict the facts placed in the record
by the Respondent.

The only facts in the record are those

presented by the Respondent.

It seems clear that after reviewing

the facts in the record, the trial court had no alternative but
to grant the summary judgment.

Respondant further alleges that

even if the facts as alleged by the Appellant were proved and allowed
into the record, it would still not change the outcome.
Appellant is still trying to relitigate this case on
the appellate level.

It again attacks the affidavits of the
-9-

•.-T

?

:lie r e s p o n d e n t 1 "

employees.

uiitr'" ^ r i ^ 1

court

a n d ever,

nr* /:= :

i•;.-.:.,

.

Appeli.aii".
that

there

i*

••

rites

'-rffidavlts

<:

should not

I'hls

--,.-—-;--•-; ^^>-.:^r

• :.; ; .'- :

:••":•

dsr:v

jjho a l s o

togethe:

aiiw 4<i\

be a l l o w e d

^

because

-ire

the

anu,

fplre'

x
tbe^

* LC»
^n-ini]^

. £M:\ . :

evider.ru*

. le on a

^ r=k\?: dei c e w h i c h

: •-•

<LS <•:

ue

*

.,;.

f--ey

reference.

regarding

i

* o

affidavits.

..ittdched ;;eret.

.

participated

•• '

improper

-

fficer

:..::.

is

*

'••..•ib*! ••? H f \ r s ^ ;

gave concerned

suttici^;:!

.1..^

..;. . i i.L-:' >
r • :

are

a s a u i m , . L.

: ./ . a _

(December

,-j

' .ie^ ^ e r e . t h e y

.

hearsay

giver

I.^JL-

the

bank or r i ^er

-

iasticur:ons

e revived
-".:
--*

-he

wpr
calulations
* ad

•

.bank officers] testimony rega:
L^,
lender's computations of interest cannot
qualify as a business record exception [to
the hearsay rule]
The rule applies to
written documents such as memoranda, records
or reports and by its terms does not include
oral statements."
* " l ' i^p ' "
are frorr -

~ ~.e affidavits

respondent. - :-

they are writer
T

*i^e ar hand.

under oath arr! \a- ed LIU UL pei ->ui\a. -.r^ * ... uj;e.
- ; *

•- *

1 earsay, ;t would

full into the bubines *o^i :s ext..^.
The affidavits were never questione-* or objected .<•
-10-

.c

trial court.

E.

Would reasonable minds differ on the calulations of damages?
Appellant suggests that the calulations by the Respondent

are not for a "sum certain11.

Clearly the sums set out in the

Summary Judgment are for a sum certain.

Appellant has not

shown or explained why they are not for a "sum certain.11

There

is not an issue here.

CONCLUSION
This court's decision in this
correct and proper.

There is no

matter is entirely

need for a rehearing as it

would just delay the matter further.
Appellant has not met his burden of proof or pursuasion.
on any of his allegations or defenses.

Summary judgment rendered

by the trial court was proper and Respondent respectfully asks
this court to deny Appellant's petition for rehearing and that
Respondent be award its costs and attorneys fees.
DATED this li/

day of March, 1988.

ffVAg
ones
for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4)
copies of the forgoing Response to Petition for Rehearing to
-11-

John Michael

Toombs at

C i t y , Utah 8-+II1

UIJL*

"?o F a o t
jp

i-

'la re

i

^ih^2-

KyL
<t>nes
Atttorne f o r Respondent

?

ADDENDUM

II 1 1 HE IJI1 TAH COURT OF AppEjy^g
- •• - 0 0 O 0 0 — •

First Security Financial,
a Utah, corporation, .
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Okland Ltd., Inc., and
Bradshaw-Ferrin Development
Company, now known as
Bradshaw Development (
a Utah corporation,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 860314-CA

Defendants and Appellant

FILED

Doug Bradshaw, Robert M.
Simonsen, City Gate
Condominium Partnership,
a limited partnership, and
John Does 3 -5,

FEB 101988
Timothy.... Snca
Clerk of the Court
Uteh Court of Appeals

Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents,

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant okland Ltd., inc. (Okland) appeals from a summj i"
judgment granted plaintiff, First Security Financial (First
Security), for Okland9s breach of an equipment lease
agreement. Okland claims on appeal that the trial court erred
in granting the motion for summary judgment because geniune
issues of material fact existed, or, alternatively, the lease
should be declared void as a penalty and the judgment reversed.
On September 31, 1981, Okland and Bradshaw-Ferrin
Development Co. (BFDC) executed an equipment lease agreement
lessees, agreeing to pay certain sums to Murray First Thrift
(MFT), lessor, for lease of personal property. MFT
simultaneously purchased the property described in tin If"1
EXHIBIT A

A-i

precluding granting of summary judgement. Those issues were:
(1) whether the lease was a security agreement; and (2) the
unavailability of documentation regarding the purchase price of
the equipment. Okland also sought leave to amend its answer to
the complaint.
On September 9, 1985, the court granted Okland*s motion to
amend its answer. The amended answer allegetd as affirmative
defenses that plaintiffs claim was barred by failure of
consideration and by the fact that the lease agreement was
really a security agreement. On September 23, 1985, the court
granted First Security's motion for summary judgment against
Okland for $33,893.23 and found that there were no factual
issues regarding whether the contract was a lease, security
agreement or contract of guarantee and no evidence that First
Security had failed to mitigate damages.
I•
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We first consider whether the trial court correctly granted
First Security's motion for summary judgment against Okland.
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and determine if the undisputed
facts before the court establish First Security's right to
judgment as a matter of law. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank,
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
Okland claims that there are two factual disputes
precluding summary judgment: (1) the damages recoverable under
the lease agreement; and (2) whether the lease agreement was
actually a security agreement.
A.
We first address the question of damages recoverable under
the agreement. First Security filed an affidavit in support of
its motion for summary judgment signed by an officer of First
Security. The affidavit states that the affiant is an officer
of First Security and that he has access to its files and has
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the affidavit.
The affidavit further avers that the equipment listed in the
lease agreement was delivered to defendants and had not been
repossessed by First Security. The affidavit concludes by
itemizing amounts due under the lease for monthly payments,
1984 and 1985 property taxes, late charges and interest accrued
as of the date of the affidavit. A later affidavit of counsel
set forth attorney fees sought by First Security.

860314-CA

3

AS

purchase the property for a nominal sura ii,( the end of the
term. Okland's memorandum in opposition to the motion fo
summary judgment includes portions of a deposition of a former
employee of NET, which supports the assertion that the
transaction was really intended as a secured sale, not a true
lease. Okland cites Colonial Leasing Cn. of Hew England. Inc.
v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as
controlling precedent. In Colonial Leasing, the trial court
excluded parol evidence offered to prove that an ostensible
lease agreement was actually intended to be a sales and
security agreement subject to the provisions of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Utah Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, stating that "whether a lease was intended as
security for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts
of each case, as is the issue of whether the nature of the
document raises questions of fact that preclude summary
judgment." I£. at 488. Okland argues, therefore, that this
case should be reversed and remanded for a factual
determination of whether a security agreement was inli ii I ill
the parties. However, the purpose of such a factual
determination must be examined. In FMA Financial Corp. v.
Pro-Printers. 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
upheld a trial court's determination that a lease of personal
property was actually a secured sale and, therefore, subject to
the provisions of Article 9. The Court further found that
plaintiff in that case had failed to properly comply with the
default provisions of Article 9 and denied it a deficiency
judgment. Plaintiff's breach consisted of a failure to disp
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
In this case, the putative secured party, First security,
did not repossess the "collateral*" prior to filing suit nor at
any time during the proceedings before us. Furthermore!
secured party is not. required by Article 9 to liquidate
collateral prior to pursuing other remedies. . Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-501 (1980) provides that a secured party's rights upon
default are alternative. A secured party "has an option to
pursue any of the parties liable on [a] note, which is secured
solely by personal property, and may also, at its option,
ignore that security and satisfy its judgment from other
property in the hands of the judgment debtor." Kennedy v. Bank
of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979). Therefore, First
Security was within its rights, even as a secured creditor, in
not repossessing and selling the "collateral," and then
applying those proceeds to the debt. The cases -cited by Okland
all involve failure of a secured creditor to properly care for
:)i: dispose of collateral. However, the duties of a secured
creditor to protect and properly sell collateral do not arise
until the secured party has exercised its right to repossess
the collateral. North Carolina Naf1 Bank v. Sharoe, 35 N.C.
860314-CA
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The trial court*s judgment is, affirmed*
to First Security,

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR

Gregory B?T Orme, Judg
Judge
5%s935*^e<§£
Norman H. Jackson;
Judge
if? Judg<

860314-CA

7

Kyle W. Jones - 1744
Attorney for Plaintiff
200 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 U 0 1
Telephone: 359-7771
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs
OKLAND LTD., INC. and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants
OKLAND LTD., INC.,
Third-Party
Plainciff,

Civil No. C-84-2941
vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN,
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,
a limited partnership and
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,

Assigned:

Judge Bill]

Third-Party
Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant
Okland Ltd., Inc., came on regularly for hearing before the Honorab
EXHIBIT B

A*

Judith Billings, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday,

September 23, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m.

P l a i n t i f f appears:

by and through its attorney of record, Kyle W. Jones, and
defendant Okland Ltd., Inc. appeared by and through its attorney
of record, John Michael Coombs. No other parties appeared on
behalf of any of the other parties in this matter. The court,
after hearing the arguments in this matter, having reviewed the
pleadings on file herein, finds that there is no factual issue
with respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease
or a security agreement or a contract of guarantee and that
plaintiff has properly pursued its remedies and that there is no
evidence to support defendant's allegation that the plaintiff
failed to mitigate its damages thereby the court enters this
Judgment as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1
plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Okland
Ltd., Inc., be granted and that plaintiff be awarded Judgment in
the following amounts:
$24,030.89 amount remaining to be paid under contract
363.52 property taxes for 1984;
341.80 property taxes for 1985;
1,201.25 late charges pursuant to contract;
6,055.77 interest;
1,900.00 attorney's fees
$33,893.23 Total Judgment
with interest on the total Judgment at eighteen percent (18%) per
annum as provided by the contract from the date of this Judgment
until paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and the
expenses of location, repossession and sale of the leased equipme*
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff be granted all necessary writs and orders necessary to
recover its leased equipment if and when it is located.
DATED this /^
day of September, 1985.
BY THE COURT
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judgment as a matter of law. Based upon
various documents (including an affidavit) and
memoranda on file, the trial court found as
follows: the "Bryner Clinic Employees Profit
Sharing Plan* was organized in 1968, and the
'Bryner Clinic, Inc. Employees Pension
Trust* was organized in 1977; Howard C.
Sharp, Max W. Steele, and Steven W. Bergstedt are the trustees for both entities; and the
deed to 'Bryner Clinic Employees' Profit
Sharing and Pension Trusts* was considered
by respondents to be jointly owned by the two
entities for which they served as trustees. The
court concluded that the actual name of the
grantee, if incorrect, was not a material defect
as to invalidate the deed since '[sufficient
extrinsic evidence exists to allow proper identification of the intended grantee.' The court
thereupon granted respondents' motion for
summary judgment, quieting title to 'Howard
C. Sharp, Max W. Steele and Steven W.
Bergstedt, Trustees of the Bryner Clinic
Employees Profit Sharing Plan' and 'Howard
C. Sharp, Max W. Steele and Steven W.
Bergstedt, Trustees of the Bryner Clinic, Inc.
Employees Pension Trust' as tenants in
common. Appellant's judgment was held not
to have attached to the property since the deed
was recorded more than two years prior to the
date of judgment and because at the time the
judgment was entered, AFCO had no interest
in the property. On appeal, appellant requests
that this Court reverse and hold that the 1979
deed is a nullity conveying no priority to respondents.
Appellant argues that the grantee of a deed
must be a natural or artificial person capable
of taking and holding title to property. Bums
v. GrMblc, 138 Cai. App. 2d 280, 291 P.2d 969
(1956), and that if no such person exists, attempted conveyances are deemed 'mere nullities.' Nilsoa v. Hamilton, 53 Utah 594, 174 P.
624 (1918). He claims that trusts are property
interests which cannot hold property. We
agree and vacate the summary judgment.
An attempted conveyance of land to a
nonexisting entity is void. See Nilson v.
Hamilton, 53 Utah at 600, 174 P. at 626,
where we held that a deed which named a
deceased person or his estate as a grantee was
void because neither the estate nor the deceased person was a legal entity. See also Rixford
v. Zciglcr, 150 Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092,
1093 (1907), where it is said:
[A] deed of conveyance is void
unless the grantee named is capable
of taking and holding the property
named in the deed; and the general
rule also is that to make a deed
effective the grantee must be a
person, either natural or artificial,
capable of taking and holding the
property.

Since the deed here named a nonentity as the
grantee, we cannot agree with the trial court
that the deed did not contain 'a material
defect." The deed conveyed no interest whatever.
Respondents, in their amended complaint,
sought as alternative relief reformation of the
deed so as to substitute the trustees as the
grantees of the deed. However, the trial court
did not reach the claim for reformation or
make any ruling thereon since it incorrectly
concluded that the naming of the trust as the
grantee was not a material defect. Because the
grantee was a nonentity, the defect was material.
The summary judgment quieting title in
respondents is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of
respondents' claim for reformation, subject to
any defenses appellant may raise thereto.
Durham, Justice, having disqualified
herself, does not participate herein.
1. Other judgment creditors of AFCO were also
joined as party-defendants. All of the other defendants have either executed a disclaimer of interest
in the property or have defaulted by failing to
answer the complaint.
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OPINION

GREENWOOD*
Lincove Partnership (*Lincove*) appeals
from the trial court's consolidation of case
nos. 12,342 and 12,251, the denial of its
motion to allow a counterclaim, bring in third
party defendants and set aside a partial
summary judgment, and the trial court's
admission of hearsay. We affirm in part and
remand.
The procedural background of this case is
central to this appeal, and is, therefore, set
forth in detail. Lincove executed a trust deed
and trust deed note whereby it agreed to pay
Basin State Bank $1,120,000 with interest for
the purchase of a subdivision ('the property*)
which collateralized the loan. The note provided that in the event of default, the entire
sum would become due and payable. After the
trust deed was recorded, Wayne Tripp and
others performed work on the property. On
July 27, 1983, Wayne Tripp filed an action in
case no. 12,251 against Jeff Vaughn, Lincove,
Basin State Bank and various lienholders,
seeking to foreclose his mechanic's lien on the
property. On August 29, 1983 attorneys
Charles Abbott and Brent Jensen answered the
complaint on behalf of Jeff Vaughn and
Lincove. On September 22, 1983, Basin State
Bank filed a foreclosure action against
Lincove and others in case no. 12,342.
On November 18, 1983, Basin State Bank
filed a motion to consolidate the two cases. A
notice of the hearing on thfc motion to consolidate was sent to Charles Abbott as attorney
for Lincove on November 22, 1983. The
motion was heard on November 30, 1983, and
the coutf ordered the cases consolidated.
DeLoy Salknback filed an answer in Basin
State Bank's foredoture action on behalf of
two Lincove partners on January 9, 1984. On
December 5, 1984 the court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Wayne Tripp
and others, against Lincove and general partners Richard L. Buchanan, Robert King and
DeVerl Byington, finding they had failed to
file or obtain a bond as required by Utah
Code Ann. {14-2-1. On December 27,
1984, Kenneth Clarke, a law partner of Mr.
Salknback, attended a trial on behalf of
Lincove, where the priority of the lienholders
was litigated. Trial on the remaining issues
was set for February 1, 1985. On January 15,
1985, Mr. Clarke, filed an entry of appearance
of counsel, a motion to bring in third party
defendants and a motion to allow a counterclaim. Mr. Clarke filed an affidavit with his
motions, citing his short period of time on the
case, his heavy workload and his family problems as the reasons the court should grant
the motions. On January 21, 1985, Mr. Clarke
For
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filed a motion to continue the trial. The trial
was continued until March 19, 1985. On
February 1, 1985, Lincove filed a motion to
set aside the partial summary judgment in
favor of Wayne Tripp.
On March 19, 1985, the court denied the
motion to set aside the partial summary judgment, motion to bring in third party defendants and motion to allow a counterclaim, and
the trial was held. At trial, the executive vice
president of Basin State Bank testified that the
accrued interest due on the $1,120,000 loan
was $366,300.47. Lincove's attorney objected
to the testimony on the grounds that it was
hearsay. The court allowed the testimony into
evidence under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule. At the conclusion of the
trial, the court found that Basin State Bank
had priority over afl other liens and ordered
foreclosure of the property.
Lincove raises the following issues on
appeal: 1) whether Basin State Bank gave
timely notice of the consolidation of the cases
to Lincove; 2) whether the court erred in
denying Lincove's motions to allow a counterclaim and to bring in third party defendants;
3) whether the court erred in denying
Lincove's motion to set aside the partial
summary judgment; and 4) whether the court
erred in admitting the bank officer's testimony into evidence.
I.
Lincove's first claim on appeal is that Basin
State Bank failed to provide it with timely
notice of the motion to consolidate and the
nature of the hearing on March 19, 1985.
Notice, to be adequate, must be reasonably
calculated to apprise interested persons of the
pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. Nelson
v. Jaootoen, 669 P 2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983).
The notice must "adequately (inform] the
parties of the specific issues they must prepare
to meet/ Id. at 1213.
On November 22, 1983, notice of the
hearing on the motion to consolidate was sent
to Charles Abbott as attorney for Lincove.
Therefore, Lincove received timely notice of
that hearing. Further, a notice of the March
19, 1985 hearing was sent to Mr. Salknback as
counsel for Lincove on March 6, 1985. The
notice stated that the hearing would address
the foreclosure of Basin State Bank's trust
deed. Lincove clearly received adequate notice
of the hearing on March 19, 1985 and the
issues it would be required to meet. Therefore,
we find that Basin State Bank provided
Lincove with timely notice of the motion to
consolidate and the hearing on March 19,
1985.

n.
Lincove also contends that the court erred
in denying Lincove's motions to allow a
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oounterdaim and to bring in third party def- between filing the answer and filing these
endants. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro- motions. Although Mr. Clarke had only been
cedure a compulsory counterclaim shall be npmenfing the parties for a short period of
filed and a permissive counterclaim may be time, his partner, Mr. Salknback, had filed
filed within the twenty days allowed for filing Lincove's answer and had ample time to file
the answer. Utah R. Ov. P. 12(a), 13(a) and the counterclaim and third party complaint. In
(b). However, '(wjhen a pleader fails to set up addition, Lincove has failed to demonstrate
a oounterdaim through oversight, inadvert- with any particularity whatsoever that the
ence, or excusable neglect, or when justice court's failure to allow the amendments to the
requires, he may by leave of court set up the pleadings resulted in prejudice. Therefore, we
counterclaim by amendment/ Utah R. Ov. P. find that the trial court did not abuse its dis13(e).
cretion in denying the motions to allow a
A defendant, as third party plaintiff, may counterclaim and to bring in third party defserve a third party defendant with a summons endants which were filed two weeks before the
and complaint and need not obtain leave to scheduled trial date, where inadequate reasons
make the service 'if he fiks the third-party for the untimely motion were presented and
complaint not later than ten days after he where the parties failed to demonstrate that
serves his original answer. Otherwise he must the court's denial of the motions resulted in
obtain leave on motion upon notice to all prejudice.
parties to the action.* Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a).
in.
Further, Utah R. Ov. P. 15(a) provides that a
The third issue is whether the court erred in
party who has not amended his pleadings
within the time provided for in the rule, may denying Lincove's motion to set aside the
amend his pleading 'only by leave of court or partial summary judgment. In reviewing the
by written consent of the adverse party; and court's original grant of summary judgment,
leave shall be fredy given when justice so we apply 'the same analytical standard incumbent upon the trial court: the grant of such a
requires/
In interpreting Rule 15(a), the Utah motion (or the affirmance thereof) is approSupreme Court has stated that 'the granting priate only where there exist no genuine issues
of leave to amend is a matter which lies within of fact relevant to the disposition of the claim
the broad discretion of the court, and its underlying the motion/ L St A Dtywnll, Inc.
rulings are not to be disturbed in the absence v. Whitmorc Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 628
of a showing of an abuse of discretion resul- (Utah 1980).
On December 5, 1984, the trial court
ting in prejudice to the complaining party/
Okmd v. Appkby, 660 P.2d 245, 24* (Utah granted partial summary judgment in favor of
1983). In Utah, the rule is 'to allow amend- Wayne Tripp and four defendants and against
ments fredy where justice requires, and espe- Lincove in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
cially is this true before trial/ GUImMn v. {14-2-1 (1986). Recording to Utah Code
Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 PJ2d 1045, 1046 Ann. (14-2-1,
(1971). The Utah Supreme Court applied this
the owner of any interest in land
rule in Gfranf where the motion to amend was
entering into a contract, involving
not made until the day of trial and proposed
S2,000 or more, for the construcnew and different causes of action. The Utah
tion ... of any building, structure,
Supreme Court held that the trial court did
or improvement upon land shall,
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
before any work is commenced,
to amend where the plaintiff was unable to
obtain from the contractor a bond
state an adequate reason for the untimely
in a sum equal to the contract price
motion and defendants claimed they would be
.... Any person who has ... perfoprejudiced in their defense.
rmed labor for or upon any such
building ... or improvement, for
In this case, the consolidated actions were
which payment has not been made,
commenced in the summer and fall of 1983. In
has a direct right of action against
January 1984, Mr. SaDenback, u counsel for
the sureties upon such bond ... for
linoove, Richard L. Buchanan and DeVerl
Byington, filed an answer to the complaint.
the reasonable value of the materThirteen months later and two weeks before
ials furnished, or for labor perfothe scheduled trial date, Mr. Clarke, on behalf
rmed, not exceeding the prices
of Lincove, filed the motion to allow a counagreed upon.
terclaim and motion to bring in third party
Lincove did not dispute its failure to obtain
defendants. Mr. Clarke attached an affidavit a bond and did not oppose that portion of the
to the motions which explained that he had motion for summary judgment. The court
only been counsel on the case since December granted summary judgment only with regard
17, 1984, and that his workload and family to Lincove's failure to obtain the bond. On
problems limited his ability to give the case his February 5, 1985, Lincove filed a motion to
immediate attention. However, the motions set aside the partial summary judgment pursfailed to explain the thirteen month delay
Wm caaplsls Ufh Cads Aaastadiis,
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uant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(h). Supporting
affidavits were filed by Mr. Clarke and Mr.
Salknback. Mr. Salknbnck's affidavit stated
he had received the various motions for
summary judgment and that Richard and
Lucille Buchanan and DeVerl Byington were
"never apprised in the material developments
on the project insofar as monies claimed by
the subcontractors." Mr. Clarke's affidavit
did not address whether disputed issues of
material fact existed nor even the factual basis
for the partial summary judgment. These
documents fail to demonstrate that genuine
issues of material fact existed precluding the
grant of partial summary judgment. Therefore, we find no error in the court's refusal to
set aside the partial summary judgment.
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admissible under the rale must be written.
Wigmon on Evidence (1528 (3d cd 1974).
Finally, the Utah courts have consistently
applied the rule to written assertions. Suae v.
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah IMS); Kehl
v. Scbwcaduum, 735 PJd 413, 416 (Utah
App. 1987). In this case* no written data
compilation or record indicating the amount
of interest due on the loan was submitted at
trial. Therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the oral testimony into evidence as a
business records exception.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed
but the matter is remanded to the trial court
with instructions to vacate the amount of
interest due on the loan and award interest
calculated at the legal rate as provided in Utah
Code Ann, §15-1-4(1986).
Affirmed in part and remanded for entry of
amended judgment.
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

IV.
The fourth issue is whether the trial court
erred in allowing into evidence the bank
officer's testimony regarding the amount of
interest due on the $1,120,000. loan. Lincove
claims that the testimony was inadmissible
hearsay. However, the trial judge admitted the
testimony into evidence under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifCtoeat
ying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
71
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to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). Business records which
IN THE
satisfy the requirements of Utah R. Evid.
UTAH
COURT
OF APPEALS
803(6) will not be excluded as hearsay. Utah
R. Evid. 803(6) states:
Barbara DeLUGA,
Records of regularly conducted
naran,
activity. A memorandum, report,
v*
record, or data compilation, in any
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
form, of acts, events, conditions,
SECURITY,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or
Defendant.
near the time by ... a person with
Before
Judges Greenwood, BWngs and
knowledge, if kept in the course of
Jackson.
a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular praNo, 870K3-CA
ctice of that business activity to
FILED:
December 2 , 1 * 7
make the ... data compilation, all as
shown by the testimony of the
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
custodian....
ATTORNEYS:
At trial, Howard Carroll, executive vice
president of Basin State Bank testified that the Jeffrey O. Burkhardt for Plaintiff
total interest due and owing on the $1,200,000 K. Allan Zabd, Lorin R. Blauer for
loan was $336,330.47. Mr. Carroll testified
Defendant.
that several lending institutions participated in
the loan in differing amounts. Each lender
OPINION
submitted its computations to him over the
telephone, and Mr. Carroll compiled the GREENWOOD, Jndge:
amounts. Mr. Carroll's testimony regarding
Plaintiff appeals from the Industrial Comeach lender's computations of interest cannot mission's denial of her application for unequalify as a business records exception. The mployment compensation. We reverse and
rule applies to written documents such as remand.
memoranda, records or reports and by its
Plaintiff, Barbara A. DeLuca, began
terms does not include oral statements.
working for Deseret Medical, Inc. on NoveFurther, it has generally been assumed in the
mber 21, 1963. During her employment she
judicial phrasing of the rule that the statement
developed and was treated for a panic and
Far coaplrtt Utah C o * AiotadsM, ceasalt C*tft«Ce*s Aanelaflea Ssrvke

A13

